⎇
Open pull requests
Cyborg branches from latest main, commits its work to cyborg/<ticket-id>, opens PR with autogenerated title + body + linked issue. Always ≤ 400 LOC where possible.
contents:write · pull_requests:write
TOOL · I/02 · DEV TRIBE
GitHub — where the engineering Cyborg opens, reviews, ships PRs.
Install the A'nil Cyborg GitHub App on your org in 90 seconds. Your engineering Cyborg gets a bot identity (@cyborg-eng[bot]) that opens PRs, reviews diffs with line-level comments, runs CI + security scans, manages labels + milestones, triages issues, and posts status checks. Never pushes directly to protected branches. All commits signed + verified. Full audit log streamed to your S3 / Datadog.
FREE with any Engineering Cyborg
·
INSTALL 90 seconds
·
PERMISSIONS 9 (least-privilege)
— 02 / WHAT IT DOES IN GITHUB
— CAPABILITIES
9 things the Cyborg does on GitHub — all behind branch protection.
Every action is bot-attributed (cyborg-eng[bot]), every commit is GPG-signed and verifiable, every push lands on a cyborg/* branch. Cyborg cannot push to main, cannot delete branches, cannot bypass required reviews. All by design, enforced by branch protection rules we ship by default.
⊜
Review diffs · line-level comments
Reviews incoming human PRs against your style guide + security checklist + test coverage rules. Posts inline review comments + summary. Never auto-merges human PRs.
perm:pull_requests:write▲
Run + manage CI checks
Posts a cyborg-eng/review status check that gates merge. Triggers Actions workflows on its own PRs. Reads check run results. Cannot disable other checks.
checks:write · actions:read⌬
Triage + label issues
Auto-labels new issues (bug, feature, docs, p0/p1/p2), assigns to milestone, suggests owner from CODEOWNERS. Asks for missing info on incomplete reports.
issues:write▲
Security + Dependabot triage
Reviews Dependabot alerts. For low-risk dep bumps, opens PR with changelog summary + risk note. For high-risk, files issue with mitigation plan + escalates in Slack.
perm:security_events:read · vulnerability_alerts:read★
Repository read · codebase context
Reads code + docs + git history of repos it's installed on, for context. Embeds + indexes locally (encrypted, per-customer key). Re-indexed on push.
perm:contents:read · metadata:read◇
Comment on commits + discussions
Comments on direct commits to flag missing tests / convention drift. Joins Discussions to answer architectural questions with citations to your codebase.
perm:discussions:write · contents:read◓
Project board sync
Moves cards between columns (To-do → In-progress → In-review → Done) as PR state changes. Syncs with Linear / Jira if you use both.
projects:write⊕
Branch + tag operations (limited)
Creates + pushes to cyborg/* branches only. Cannot push to main, release/*, prod, or any branch matched by your protection rules. Cannot force-push. Cannot delete branches outside its own namespace.
contents:write (namespace-scoped)
— 03 / SAMPLE
— REAL PR · ANONYMISED · TUESDAY 11:02 IST
A real PR review — opened by a human, reviewed by Cyborg.
Engineer Dharmesh opened PR #4218 to refactor a caching layer. Cyborg reviewed it in 47 seconds: 3 inline comments, 1 security flag, 1 test-coverage note, 1 approval after fix. This is what your engineers see in their reviews tab every day.
Open
Refactor caching layer to use Redis cluster mode #4218
8585 public String build(String prefix, Object[] parts) {8686 var sb = new StringBuilder(prefix);87− for (var p : parts) sb.append(':').append(p.toString());87+ for (var p : parts) sb.append(':').append(p);8888 return sb.toString();8989 }CE
cyborg-engbot
request changes
Removed the explicit p.toString() — StringBuilder.append(Object) calls String.valueOf(), which renders null as the literal string "null". With cluster reroutes, parts can briefly contain null entries during a slot migration. Suggest:
for (var p : parts) {
if (p == null) throw new IllegalArgumentException("null cache-key part");
sb.append(':').append(p);
}Or accept the "null" literal but document the contract. Either is fine — "silently emits 'null'" is the surprising option.
140140 client := redis.NewClusterClient(&redis.ClusterOptions{141141 Addrs: cfg.Addrs,142+ TLSConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},142143 })CE
cyborg-engbot
security · high
Disables TLS certificate verification on the Redis cluster client. This is a man-in-the-middle vulnerability — anything between this service and the Redis nodes (load balancer, sidecar, ingress) can present a forged cert and we won't notice. Recommend: load the cluster CA bundle and set RootCAs instead. If this is a temporary debug flag, please revert before merge and add a TODO with an issue link.
CE
cyborg-engbot
test coverage
Coverage on touched files dropped from 87% → 81% (project floor: 80%, so still passing). Missing tests for the new cluster-reroute path: shouldRetryOnSlotMigration(), shouldNotRetryOnAuthError(), shouldFailoverToReplicaWhenPrimaryDown(). Happy to draft these — they're standard Redis cluster cases and your existing test scaffold supports them.
ANONYMISED FROM A LIVE CUSTOMER REPO · CONFIG STRINGS + FILE NAMES SCRUBBED · ALL CYBORG REVIEW LANGUAGE VERBATIM
— 04 / PERMISSIONS · LEAST PRIVILEGE
9 permissions — not 30. No
— GITHUB APP · NOT OAUTH USER TOKEN
9 permissions — not 30. No admin:org. No repo:delete. Ever.
Installed as a GitHub App (org-level), not an OAuth user app. No human's personal token. Repo selection is per-installation: pick exactly which repos the Cyborg can see (default: explicit allowlist, not "all"). Org admin can revoke per-repo or org-wide in 1 click.
| Permission | What it allows | Why we need it | Risk | Default |
|---|---|---|---|---|
contents:read |
Read repository code, tags, branches | Index your codebase for context-aware reviews + suggestions. | Low | ON |
contents:write |
Push commits to non-protected branches only | Push to cyborg/* branches to open PRs. Branch-protection rules block main, release/*, prod. |
Medium | ON |
pull_requests:write |
Open / comment / approve PRs | Open PRs from cyborg/* branches; review human PRs with line-level comments + summary. |
Low | ON |
checks:write |
Post check runs (status checks) | Post the cyborg-eng/review status check that gates merge. |
Low | ON |
actions:read |
Read workflow runs + logs (own repo) | Inspect failing CI logs to suggest fixes. Cannot trigger arbitrary workflows. | Low | ON |
issues:write |
Open / label / comment issues | Triage incoming issues, file follow-ups for security alerts, link issues to PRs. | Low | ON |
security_events:read |
Read CodeQL + secret-scan alerts | Triage security alerts, draft mitigation PRs for low-risk dep bumps. | Low | ON |
vulnerability_alerts:read |
Read Dependabot vulnerability alerts | Auto-PR low-risk dep bumps; escalate high-risk to humans via Slack. | Low | ON |
discussions:write |
Comment in repo Discussions | Answer architectural / "how-do-I" questions with citations to your code. | Low | OPT-IN |
NEVER REQUESTED: admin:org · admin:repo_hook · delete_repo · repo (classic full scope) · workflow:write · packages:write · members:write · user OAuth tokens (only GitHub App installation tokens, scoped + short-lived). |
||||
— 05 / BRANCH PROTECTION · OUR DEFAULTS
— SHIPPED AS PART OF INSTALL · YOU CAN OVERRIDE
Cyborg installs its own guardrails.
During install, Cyborg offers to apply these branch-protection rules to main + release/* in each selected repo. You can accept the bundle, customise per-repo, or skip and apply your own. Cyborg's own permissions are calibrated to be blocked by these rules. If you skip, Cyborg still cannot force-push or delete — those are GitHub-side hard caps for Apps.
1
Require PR before merge
No direct push to main — even from org admins. Cyborg's contents:write respects this.
2
Require ≥ 1 human review
Cyborg's review counts as a second opinion, not a first. A human must approve before merge.
DEFAULT · ON3
Require status checks
ci/* + security/* + cyborg-eng/review must all pass before merge can fire.
4
Dismiss stale reviews on push
Any new commit invalidates prior approvals. No "approve at v1, sneak in v6" attacks.
DEFAULT · ON5
Require signed commits
Cyborg signs all its commits with a per-customer GPG key. Humans should too — we'll prompt.
DEFAULT · ON6
Require linear history
Squash- or rebase-merge only. No merge commits soup. Easier audit, easier revert.
DEFAULT · ON7
Require branch up-to-date
Must rebase on latest main before merge fires. No skew between PR view and prod.
8
Block force-push + deletion
Hard-blocked at GitHub side — for everyone, including org admins, including Cyborg.
DEFAULT · ON
— 06 / INSTALL
— 90 SECONDS · ORG ADMIN APPROVAL REQUIRED
Install flow: 5 clicks, your repos picked explicitly.
-
01
Click "Install GitHub App"
From any Engineering Cyborg's hire flow or from this page. Opens GitHub App install screen.
-
02
Pick org + select repos
Default: "Only select repositories". Pick exactly which repos Cyborg may see. "All repositories" is allowed but not recommended.
-
03
Review 9 permissions + approve
GitHub shows the exact permission list. Org admin approves (most teams in 30 seconds). Single-click revoke anytime from org settings.
-
04
Branch-protection bundle (optional)
Cyborg offers to apply our 8-rule defaults to
main+release/*in selected repos. Accept all, customise, or skip. -
05
First PR & audit stream
Cyborg opens a "hello, this is what I'll do" PR (small, no-op style guide doc). You review, merge or close. From here on, every action streams to your Cyborg audit log + optional S3 / Datadog / Splunk webhook.
— 07 / ROLES THAT USE GITHUB
— 4 OF 12
Engineering, Design, PM and Data — all push code or read it.
Software Engineer is the heaviest user. Designer pushes design tokens + Storybook updates. PM links issues to deliveries. Data Analyst commits dbt models + dashboard configs. Each role has a separate bot identity.
— 08 / SECURITY MODEL
— BOTH SIDES OF THE WIRE
GitHub-side + Cyborg-side. Defense in depth.
GitHub-side (your org)
- GitHub App, not OAuth user. No human's personal token leaks if a Cyborg credential rotates.
- Per-repo allowlist. "Only select repositories" is the default. You pick exactly which repos.
- Branch protection enforces our limits. Cyborg's permissions are designed to be blocked by standard protection rules.
- Bot-attributed every action.
cyborg-eng[bot]shows up on every commit, comment, PR, and check. - Single-click revoke. Org settings → Installed GitHub Apps → A'nil Cyborg → Uninstall. Removes all access in < 5 seconds.
Cyborg-side (our infra)
- Installation tokens. 1-hour expiry, scoped to install, never persisted to disk — minted on-demand.
- Per-customer GPG signing key. Generated in your tenancy at install, never leaves our HSM.
- Code embeddings encrypted. AES-256, per-customer KMS key, no cross-tenant access. Embeddings only, not raw code.
- Audit log every action. Every API call — logged with timestamp + repo + actor + payload digest.
- Stream to your S3 / Datadog / Splunk via outbound webhook. SOC 2 Type II + ISO 27001 reports under NDA.
— PRICING
See Cyborg pricing
GitHub is free with any Engineering / Design / PM / Data Cyborg.
No per-PR charge. No per-repo charge. No "GitHub Enterprise tier" upsell — we support github.com Cloud, GitHub Enterprise Cloud, and GitHub Enterprise Server (self-hosted) at the same price. Even unlimited PR reviews on your busiest monorepo are included.
— 10 / FAQ
— ENGINEERING LEAD + SECURITY QUESTIONS
Sawaal jo VP Eng + Security poochte hain.
Can Cyborg push directly to main or force-push anywhere?
No, on both. (1) Cyborg only pushes to cyborg/* branches; the contents:write permission is respected by branch-protection rules, which block writes to main / release/* / prod. (2) GitHub Apps fundamentally cannot force-push or delete branches that have protection enabled — this is a GitHub-side guarantee, not a Cyborg promise. We've never had a force-push or branch deletion incident across 2,847 orgs.
Can Cyborg approve its own PRs to satisfy the "1 human review" rule?
No. GitHub's review-required rule, when set to "Require review from Code Owners" or "Require approval from someone other than the author", treats cyborg-eng[bot] as the author of its own PRs — so it can never self-approve. Cyborg can review human PRs (and post a non-blocking suggestion-only review), but the merge gate still requires a human approver. This is the design.
Does Cyborg train on our private code?
No, never. Your code is indexed (encrypted embeddings) for context retrieval at review time — that's a per-customer index, not a shared training set. We have a contractual no-train clause (your DPA + MSA both spell it out), and architecturally there is no pipeline from your tenant's embeddings to any model fine-tuning. Embeddings are deleted within 30 days of repo removal.
What about GitHub Enterprise Server (self-hosted)?
Fully supported. We install the GitHub App on your GHES instance the same way (org admin approves), and Cyborg connects via your GHES API URL. If your GHES is air-gapped, we offer a Cyborg satellite container that runs inside your network (talks only to your GHES + your cyborg-control-plane). Same pricing.
Can Cyborg modify GitHub Actions workflows?
No — workflow:write is in our NEVER-REQUEST list. Cyborg can read workflow runs (actions:read) to understand failures and suggest fixes, but it cannot create / modify / delete .github/workflows/*.yml. If a PR from Cyborg touches a workflow file, GitHub itself blocks the push and the PR gets rejected. Workflow changes are always human-authored.
What about secrets in the codebase — does Cyborg see them?
If a secret is committed in plaintext, yes — same as any human reviewer. That's a problem for both of us, and Cyborg flags it as a P0 security issue immediately. We integrate with GitHub Secret Scanning so leaked tokens get rotated automatically (where supported) and Cyborg never includes detected secret content in its embedding index. Best practice: use GitHub Encrypted Secrets / your secret manager — Cyborg never asks for, sees, or stores those.
If we cancel, what happens to Cyborg's commits and reviews?
Your repo history is yours — we never owned it. On uninstall: the GitHub App is removed in < 5 seconds, all installation tokens are revoked, our 30-day rolling embeddings index is purged within 7 days. Every commit Cyborg authored stays in your repo forever (signed, attributable, auditable). Optional: we provide a CSV export of every PR + review + comment Cyborg made for your records.
Refactor LGTM in shape — Redis cluster mode is the right move and the abstraction is clean. 3 things to address before merge: a missing null-guard in
CacheKeyBuilder.build()(potential NPE under cluster reroute), a security flag onRedisClusterClientinstantiation (cert verification disabled incluster.go:142), and test coverage dropped from 87% → 81% on the touched files. I can fix all 3 in a follow-up PR if helpful, just@-cyborg-eng fix-itand I'll branch off this one.